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Without Supporting Statistical Evidence, Where Would Reported
Measures of Substantive Importance Lead? To No Good Effect
Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie

Joel R. Levin

University of South Florida

University of Arizona

Although estimating substantive importance (in the form of reporting effect sizes) has recently received
widespread endorsement, its use has not been subjected to the same degree of scrutiny as has statistical
hypothesis testing. As such, many researchers do not seem to be aware that certain of the same criticisms
launched against the latter can also be aimed at the former. Our purpose here is to highlight major concerns
about effect sizes and their estimation. In so doing, we argue that effect size measures per se are not the
hoped-for panaceas for interpreting empirical research findings. Further, we contend that if effect sizes were
the only basis for interpreting statistical data, social-science research would not be in any better position than
it would if statistical hypothesis testing were the only basis. We recommend that hypothesis testing and
effect-size estimation be used in tandem to establish a reported outcome’s believability and magnitude,
respectively, with hypothesis testing (or some other inferential statistical procedure) retained as a
“gatekeeper” for determining whether or not effect sizes should be interpreted. Other methods for addressing
statistical and substantive significance are advocated, particularly confidence intervals and independent
replications.
Key words: Effect-size concerns, statistical inference, substantive importance

Introduction

Since 1950, for example, the number of
articles published in the fields of education,
psychology, ecology, and medicine criticizing
hypothesis testing has been increasing at an
exponential rate (Anderson, Burnham, &
Thompson, 2000). Additionally:

Statistical
hypothesis
testing
has
been
implemented to assess the believability, or non“chanceness” (Levin, 1998b; Levin & Robinson,
1999), of research findings for more than 75 years,
stemming from the seminal works of Fisher
(1925/1941) and Neyman and Pearson (1928).
Despite the widespread use of hypothesis testing
during most of the last century through today, its
practice has been controversial. Indeed, over the
past few decades testing for statistical significance
has come under close scrutiny.

(a) professional journals (e.g., The Journal of
Experimental Education and Research in the
Schools) have devoted special theme issues to
statistical hypothesis testing; and
(b) symposia have been held at national annual
meetings , such as the American Educational
Research Association, the American Psychological
Association, and the American Psychological
Society. Even an edited book, What if there were
no significance tests? (Harlow, Mulaik, & Steiger,
1997), has been devoted exclusively to the topic.
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The Case Against Statistical Hypothesis Testing
Some of the staunchest critics of statistical
hypothesis testing contend that this practice has
been extremely harmful to scientific progress in
the social sciences. For example, Meehl (1978, p.
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817) stated that it “is a terrible mistake, a basically
unsound, poor scientific strategy, and one of the
worst things that ever happened in the history of
psychology.” Rozeboom (1997) continued:
Null-hypothesis significance
testing is surely the most boneheadedly misguided procedure
ever institutionalized in the rote
training of science students...[I]t is
a sociology-of-science
wonderment that this statistical
practice has remained so
unresponsive to criticism. (p. 335)
Similarly, Tryon (1998) complained:
[T]he fact that statistical experts
and investigators publishing in the
best journals cannot consistently
interpret the results of these
analyses is extremely disturbing.
Seventy-two years of education
have resulted in minuscule, if any,
progress toward correcting this
situation. It is difficult to estimate
the handicap that widespread,
incorrect, and intractable use of a
primary data analytic method has
on a scientific discipline, but the
deleterious effects are
undoubtedly substantial. (p. 796)
Schmidt and Hunter (1997, p. 37) claimed that
“[s]tatistical significance testing retards the growth
of scientific knowledge; it never makes a positive
contribution,” and Thompson (1992b, p. 436)
added: “[Statistical significance testing] has
created considerable damage as regards the
cumulation of knowledge.”
As a result of the purported flaws that
statistical hypothesis testing has been accused of,
several researchers have recommended that it be
banned completely (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Cahan,
2000; Carver, 1978, 1993; Cohen, 1994; Guttman,
1985; Loftus, 1996; Meehl, 1967, 1978; Nix &
Barnette, 1998; Rozeboom, 1960; Schmidt, 1992;
1996; Schmidt & Hunter, 1997). Although we: (a)
agree that statistical hypothesis testing has been
misused, and (b) concur with many of the
criticisms of it that have been offered, it is quite a
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leap to charge that hypothesis testing by itself has
stunted “the cumulation of knowledge”
(Thompson, 1992b, p. 436), is “one of the worst
things that ever happened in the history of
psychology” (Meehl, 1978, p. 817), or “retards the
growth of scientific knowledge... [and]... never
makes a positive contribution” (Schmidt &
Hunter, 1997, p. 37).
Furthermore, some of the assertions made
in an attempt to invalidate the hypothesis-testing
practice either have been accompanied by
unsubstantiated claims or represent flawed logic.
As noted by Krantz (1999):
It is one thing to accuse scientists
of showing their ignorance of
statistical reasoning in the course
of their science, but this does not
imply that their ultimate
conclusions will be incorrect, nor
even that their efficiency in
reaching correct conclusions will
be impaired. A causal attribution
of this sort needs to be supported
by careful empirical arguments.
(p. 1378)
The foregoing concerns aside, valid
criticisms of statistical hypothesis testing have
nonetheless been made. Fan (2001) provided a
summary of some of these criticisms:
Thompson (1993) discussed three
relevant criticisms for (sic.)
statistical significance testing: (a)
overdependency on sample size,
(b) some nonsensical
comparisons, and (c) some
inescapable dilemmas created by
statistical significance testing
(e.g., testing for assumption vs.
testing for the research
hypothesis). In a similar vein,
Kirk (1996) discussed three major
criticisms of statistical
significance testing: (a)
Significance testing does not tell
researchers what they want to
know, but rather, it creates the
illusion of probabilistic proof by
contradiction (Falk & Greenbaum,
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1995). (b) Statistical signif icance
testing is often a trivial exercise
because it simply indicates the
power of the design (which
primarily depends on the sample
size) to reject the false null
hypothesis. (c) Significance
testing “turns a continuum of
uncertainty into a dichotomous
reject-do-not-reject decision,” and
this dichotomous decision process
may “lead to the anomalous
situation in which two researchers
obtain identical treatment effects
but draw different conclusions”
(Kirk, p. 748) because of the
slight differences in their design
(e.g., sample sizes). (p. 276)

Because of these and other concerns,
many researchers have called for the reporting of
measures of practical significance (or substantive
importance, as reflected by effect size or strength
of relationship indices), either in addition to or
instead of testing for statistical significance.
Indeed, the most recent edition of the influential
Publication
Manual
of
the
American
Psychological Association (2001) states:
The general principle to be
followed...is to provide the reader
not only with information about
statistical significance but also
with enough information to assess
the magnitude of the observed
effect or relationship. (p. 26)
Certain anti-hypothesis-testers (e.g., Carver, 1993)
even go so far as to endorse effect-size estimates
as replacements for statistical significance testing
– that is, they contend that effect sizes are all that
are needed to make inferences about empirical
research outcomes. As is argued throughout the
remainder of this manuscript, however, we believe
that such practice would only lead to no good
effect!
Debates about the value and warrants of
statistical hypothesis testing can be traced back to
Boring (1919) and Berkson (1938, 1942). Over the
last decade, many researchers have seemingly
jumped on the effect-size bandwagon without

scrutinizing its use to the same degree as has
occurred for hypothesis testing. Moreover, what
appears to have been lost in all this fervor for
effect-size provision – and as we illustrate later –
is that many of the same criticisms launched
against statistical hypothesis testing can also be
aimed at effect sizes. As one salient illustration,
cautions concerning hypothesis testing and its
interpretation can be found in such sources as the
aforementioned APA Publication Manual (2001)
– namely, that p-values (statistical significance
probabilities) do not directly reflect “the
magnitude of an effect or the strength of a
relationship” (p. 25). Yet, no such cautions about
effect-size measures are found in that pivotal
reference source.
Concerns and Cautions About Effect Sizes
In what follows we highlight several
major concerns about effect sizes and their
estimation, in what might be called nine effect-size
nuisances and no-no’s. In doing so, we consider
several rarely acknowledged limitations of effectsize measures. We (as others before us) argue that
effect-size measures are influenced by, and
therefore must be interpreted with respect to, a
number of critical factors. As a preliminary
comment, we regard certain of these
considerations as being especially relevant when
effect sizes are reported as sole indicators of an
empirical study’s significance (i. e., as reflected in
Carver’s, 1993, “effect-size only” recommendation). We return to this fundamental issue in
a later section.
According to Wilkinson and the Task
Force on Statistical Inference (1999, p. 599)
“[R]eporting and interpreting effect sizes...is
essential to good research.” Unfortunately, this
statement might suggest to some that the provision
of effect sizes necessarily improves the quality of
empirical studies. Yet, the uncritical acceptance of
effect size measures is problematic because, as is
now discussed, such measures are sensitive to a
number of factors, such as: the research objective;
sampling design (including the levels of the
independent variable, choice of treatment
alternatives, and statistical analysis employed);
sample size and variability; type and range of the
measures used; and score reliability (see, for
example, Fern & Monroe, 1996; Frick, 1995;
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O’Grady, 1982; Olejnik & Algina, 2000; and
Sechrest & Yeaton, 1982).
1. The research objective. According to
Fern and Monroe (1996), one’s interpretation of an
effect size should vary, depending on whether the
objective of the study is what they call theory
application or effects application. In theoryapplication research (or explanatory studies) the
goal is to identify theories that increase our
understanding of phenomena. Studies involving
theory application, which consist primarily of
theory generation and theory testing, typically
focus on generalizing theories beyond the
underlying sample and/or context. More
specifically, in explanatory studies, the goal is to
determine the “shape or functional nature of a
relationship” (O’Grady, 1982, p. 770).
In such investigations, a large effect size is
not necessarily of interest. Indeed, a large effect
may be viewed as a negative outcome if it was not
predicted by theory. That is, in theory-application
research, a small effect may be more informative
and useful than a large effect (Calder, Phillips, &
Tybout, 1981). In fact, using “large” effect-size
guidelines (e.g., Cohen, 1988) as the criterion for
choosing among several independent variables in
explanatory studies may culminate in misleading
final theoretical models being selected.
Conversely, in effects-application research (or
predictive studies), researchers usually are not
interested in generalizing the results beyond the
levels of the variables selected. That is, in effectsapplication studies, the interest is more on the size
of the effect than on determining the
generalizability of a particular theory. This
suggests that effect sizes should not be interpreted
without taking into account whether one’s research
objective is essentially explanatory or predictive in
nature.
2. Choice of a specific research design
and experimental conditions. The selected
research design also affects interpretation of effect
sizes. Specifically, because within-subject
sampling designs typically are more efficie nt than
are between-subject sampling designs – inasmuch
as they tend to minimize error variance (Maxwell
& Delaney, 1990) – they tend to yield larger effect
sizes (Keppel, 1991; O’Grady, 1982). Therefore,
in interpreting effect sizes, consideration should be
given to the sampling design used.
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Although experimental studies allow the
strongest causal inferences to be made and
typically result in relatively smaller error variance
in
comparison
to
correlational
studies,
experimental designs also tend to yield smaller
effect sizes than do correlational designs. This is
because in experimental research the independent
variable is artificially created specifically for the
study and thus is weaker than it is in the
population (Kerlinger, 1973). As such, comparing
effect sizes stemming from experimental studies
and those generated from correlational studies
easily can be the equivalent of comparing apples
and oranges. Moreover, in fixed-effects models,
the magnitude of the omnibus effect size depends
on the specific levels of the variables of interest. If
different levels of the independent variable are
studied, the effect sizes are not comparable
(Oljenik & Algina, 2000).
Further, the number of experimental
conditions (or levels of the independent variable)
used in a study can either increase or decrease the
effect size. O’Grady (1982, p. 773) provides a
striking example of a two-conditions study
(yielding M 1 = 10 and M 2 = 18, with common SDs
of 2 and ns of 10) in which the proportion of
variance accounted for by the treatment factor
(sample 02 ) is .82. Yet, had the same two
conditions been part of a study that also included
three additional experimental conditions, whose
resulting means ranged in equal increments
between the two original means (i.e., M 3 = 12, M 4
= 14, and M 5 = 16), with the same SDs and ns as
before, the proportion of variance accounted for by
the treatment factor is reduced to .69. Of course,
had the proportion of variance associated with just
the two focal conditions been calculated and
reported (i.e., the sample 02 associated with the
Treatment 1 vs. Treatment 2 contrast), it would be
equal to the original .82.
Interpretive problems resulting from
omnibus, as opposed to contrast, strength-ofrelationship reporting were pointed out by Levin
(1967). Such problems can be further illustrated by
another hypothetical example, which represents
the “flip side” of the one just presented. Suppose
that a researcher compares two different
experimental treatments and finds that M 1 = 16
and M 2 = 17, with common SDs of 2.5 and ns of 8.
Here, the sample 02 can be found to be a fairly
“small” .04. However, had these two treatments
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been part of a study that included a low-scoring
“control” group (M 3 = 6) with the same SD and n
as in the other two conditions, now the sample 02
would be found to leap to an “impressive” .81. As
long as the researcher focused on the Treatment 1
vs. Treatment 2 contrast (for which 02 = .04), the
same conclusion about a “small” treatment
difference would have been reached as before.
Unfortunately, however, many researchers
routinely report and interpret the omnibus measure
(here, 02 = .81), to the detriment of the
unquestioning consumer. In multifactor designs a
similar opportunity arises for misleading the
consumer – namely, by not recognizing Kirk’s
(1995, p. 261) distinction between omnibus and
partial strength-of-relationship measures.
The design of an experimental study also
refers to the manner in which participants are
assigned to experimental conditions and
treatments administered (generally characterized
as between-subjects designs, within-subjects
designs, mixed designs, blocking designs, and
hierarchical designs), whether or not concomitant
variables (covariates) are included, and the
statistical analyses employed. Effect-size measures
are affected by all such factors in a design,
compromising comparisons of effect sizes across
studies that differ in their specifics (Oljenik &
Algina, 2000).
In particular, when one or more factors in
a comparison-of-means analysis represents an
individual difference factor (e.g., a covariate or
blocking variable), problems arise with respect to
what to use as the standardizer in an effect-size
index. For example, in a two-factor design in
which one factor is a manipulated factor and the
other an individual difference factor, it is often a
matter of debate whether the standardizer should
be computed by ignoring or controlling for the
individual difference factor (Oljenik & Algina,
2000). Whichever approach is taken leads to a
different effect size being computed and,
therefore, effect sizes using these two different
standardizers are not comparable. In fact, as noted
by Oljenik and Algina (2000): “depending on the
sample size and effect sizes associated with the
individual difference and interaction factors in a
two-factor design, the effect size estimated for the
manipulated factor can vary from trivial to quite
large” (p. 250).

The difference in effect sizes is even
greater if the individual difference factors vary
across studies. Because varying standardizers for
computing effect sizes are used in different
studies, researchers should compare effect sizes
only if they are completely aware of the
standardizer that was used in each study of
interest. Unfortunately, most researchers do not
specify which standardizer was used in their
effect-size computation. This discussion should
make it clear that a researcher can make an effect
size look larger or smaller by defining an effect
size in terms of the specific design and controlvariable characteristics just mentioned – basically,
by incorporating (or not) any design features that
serve to affect the error variance – and which may
have ethical implications as well.
3. Selection of an effect-size measure. We
now turn our attention to another potentially
ethically sensitive effect-size issue. Although there
is general agreement that the provision of effectsize information is valuable, recommendations
concerning the specific measure that should be
reported for a particular study are typically absent.
In our view, such recommendations are critical,
for as one of us noted previously:
Which of, say, half a dozen
different effect-size measures that
could be summoned up for a given
problem should a researcher
report? The one that is most
informative, the one that is most
conservative, or the one that
enhances the researcher’s case and
misleads the unsuspecting reader?
For example, researchers might
report percent agreement
measures or percentages of
variance accounted for that have
not been corrected for chance, or
researchers might seek out a
goodness-of-fit measure that
places their data in the most
favorable light. For dependent
measures where a frame of
reference is needed or helpful,
providing scale -free (relative)
effect sizes (e.g., Cohen’s d or
percentages of variance accounted
for) is not nearly as substantively
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interpretable as is providing the
scale -dependent (absolute)
measures in addition or
instead...In many domains, not
even knowledgeable statisticians
agree on what the “best” or “most
informative” effect-size measure
actually is. (Levin & Robinson,
1999, p. 151)
Levin (1998b, pp. 45-46) similarly
provided the following hypothetical example of
the perplexing situation that effect sizes can create
for researchers, readers, and other interpreters of
the importance of an empirical finding:
Suppose that an investigator wants
to help older adults remember an
ordered set of ten important daily
tasks that must be performed
(insert and turn on a hearing aid,
take certain pills, make a
telephone call to a caregiver, etc.).
In a sample of six elderly adults,
three are randomly assigned to
each of two experimental
conditions. In one condition (A),
no special task instruction is
given; and in the other (B1 ),
participants are instructed in the
use of self-monitoring strategies.
Following training, the
participants are observed with
respect to their success in
performing the ten tasks...[T]he
average number of tasks the
participants correctly remembered
to perform was 1.33 [SD = .577,
raw scores = 1, 1, and 2] and 3.33
[SD = .577, raw scores = 3, 3, and
4] for the no-instruction (A) and
self-monitoring (B1 ) conditions,
respectively. For [these data], it
can be determined that the
“conditions” factor accounts for a
hefty 82% of the total variation in
task performance (i.e., the squared
point-biserial correlation is .82,
which for the two-sample case, is
equivalent to the sample 02 ).
Alternatively, the self-monitoring

mean is 3-½ within-group
standard deviations higher than
the no-instruction mean (i.e.,
Cohen’s d is 3.5). From either
effect-size perspective (02 or d),
certainly this represents an
impressive treatment effect,
doesn’t it? Or does it?
Suppose that instead of selfmonitoring training, participants
were taught how to employ
“mnemonic ” (systematic memoryenhancing) techniques (B2 ) ...with
the results [yielding a mean
number correct of 7.67 (SD =
2.517, raw scores = 5, 8, and
10)]...[A] comparison with noinstruction Condition A
surprisingly reveals that once
again, the conditions factor
accounts for 82% of the total
variation in task performance
(equivalently, d again equals 3.5).
Thus, when expressed in
standardized/relative terms (either
02 or d), the effect sizes associated
with the two instructional
conditions (B1 and B2 ) are exactly
the same, and substantial in
magnitude. Yet, when expressed
in absolute terms and with respect
to the task’s maximum, there are
important differences in the
“effects” of B 1 and B2 : Increasing
participants’ average performance
from 1.33 to 3.33 tasks
remembered seems much less
impressive than does increasing it
from 1.33 to 7.67. Helping these
adults remember an average of
only 3 of their 10 critical tasks
might be regarded as a dismal
failure, whereas helping them
remember an average of almost 8
out of 10 tasks would be a
stunning accomplishment. Yet,
the conventional effect-size
measures are the same in each
case.
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To help shed light on this seeming
paradoxical situation, Levin (1998b) pointed out:
The major problem in this
example arises from the
conditions’ differing variabilities.
That problem could be accounted
for by defining alternative d-like
effect-size measures based on just
the control condition’s (Condition
A’s) standard deviation...
Interpreting effect sizes, in the
absence of raw data, remains a
problem for 02 and Cohen’s d,
however. (p. 53)
Insofar as different effect-size measures
are suitable for different types of data (e.g.,
Hogarty & Kromrey, 2001), it is surprising that
some researchers do not even indicate the index to
which they are referring when reporting effect
sizes (Kirk, 1996). Neither do researchers appear
to indicate whether the effect-size measure
interpreted represents an adjusted or unadjusted
index. The lack of information provided is
disturbing because meta-analyses involve
aggregating and comparing effect sizes across
studies. How can effect sizes be aggregated if it is
not clear whether they are based on the same type
of index? Unfortunately, the practice of some
meta-analysts to omit unlabeled effect sizes from
the aggregate index introduces bias.
4. Varying, and generally arbitrary,
guidelines for interpreting effect-size magnitudes.
As was noted earlier, a way in which statistical
hypothesis testing is abused occurs when a
dichotomous decision (i.e., reject vs. do not reject)
comprises the sole determinant of the significance
(read importance) of an observed outcome. This is
done by comparing the outcome’s significance
probability (p-value) to some predetermined
standard significance level (" level), such as .05.
Yet, many researchers who interpret effect sizes
appear to use equally rigid categorical criteria such
as those provided by Cohen (1988), who
popularized the use of effect-size reporting. This
occurs even though recommendations vary with
respect to how effect sizes should be interpreted
(McLean, O’Neal, & Barnette, 2000) and despite
Cohen’s (1988) admonishment that effect-size

values are dependent on the specific content and
methods that prevail in a given research context.
For example, in interpreting effect sizes
associated with differences between two groups
(i.e., Cohen’s d), Cohen (1988) recommended
demarcations of .20 for small effects, .50 for
medium effects, and .80 for large effects. In stark
contrast, McLean (1995) suggested the following
criteria: .50 for small effects, between .50 and 1.00
for moderate effects, and above 1.00 for large
effects. Regardless of which criteria are used, it is
clear that adherence to such cutpoints has the
effect of trichotomizing interpretations in much
the same way as p-values dichotomize statistical
decision making. As noted by Shaver (1993):
“There already is a tendency to use criteria, such
as Cohen’s (1988) standards for small, medium,
and large effect sizes, as mindlessly as has been
the practice with the .05 criterion in statistical
significance testing” (p. 311). Similarly,
Thompson (2001) stated: “If people interpreted
effect sizes [using fixed benchmarks] with the
same rigidity that " = .05 has been used in
statistical testing, we would merely be being
stupid in another metric ” (p. 82-83).
In addition, blending the previous concern
(different effect-size measures may lead to
different conclusions) with the present one (effectsize descriptors are arbitrary and vary by context)
we consider the following confusing/conflicting
medical-study conclusion presented by Rosenthal
and DiMatteo (2001). The results of a study
designed to examine the effect of taking aspirin on
heart-attack prevention (Steering Committee of the
Physicians’ Health Study Research Group, 1988)
yielded what is typically regarded as a tiny
Pearson r of .034. Yet, when the same outcome is
interpreted from the perspective of Rosenthal and
Rubin’s (1982) binomial effect size display
(BESD), the “finding is, in fact, very important
and translates into substantial reductions in
morbidity and mortality” (Rosenthal & DiMatteo,
2001, p. 78). For related discussion on the
potential importance of conventionally small
effect sizes, see Prentice and Miller (1992).
5. Sample size and sampling variability .
The interpretation of effect sizes also varies as a
function of sample size. Studies with smaller
sample sizes often result in effect sizes being
overestimated, whereas investigations with large
sample sizes tend to lead to effect sizes being
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underestimated (Bakan, 1966; Fern & Monroe,
1996; Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Empirically,
Barnette and McLean (1999) demonstrated that
standardized effect-size variation is systematic
rather than random. In their Monte Carlo
investigation, these authors found that the number
of groups and sample sizes were almost perfectly
predictive (i.e., R2 = .999) of standardized effect
sizes. Thus, comparing effect sizes across studies
with very different sample sizes can be
misleading.
One of the most repeated criticisms of
statistical hypothesis testing is its over-reliance on
sample size (Cohen, 1994; Fan, 2001; Kirk, 1996;
Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2003, in press; Schmidt
& Hunter, 1997; Thompson, 1993). Yet, as was
noted recently by Fan (2001): “effect size can also
be misleading because sample size influences the
sampling variability of an effect-size measure” (p.
275). Using Monte Carlo methods, Fan
demonstrated that an observed finding that appears
to have practical significance (i.e., a large effect
size) actually could be the result of sampling error,
thereby making any resultant conclusions
unreliable and potentially misleading – which
lends empirical support to a major facet of the
argument promoted by Levin and Robinson (2000;
see also Sawilowsky & Yoon, 2002), summarized
later. Fan (2001) recommended that information
about both statistical significance and effect sizes
be reported for observed findings:
Statistical significance testing and
effect size are two related sides
that together make a coin; they
complement each other but do not
substitute for one another. Good
research practice requires that, for
making sound quantitative
decisions in educational research,
both sides should be considered.
(p. 275)
It should come as no surprise that effect
sizes are affected by sample size in much the same
way as are p-values. Indeed, effect-size statistics
represent random variables. Consequently, effectsize measures are affected by sampling variability,
as dictated by its underlying sampling distribution.
In turn, the amount of sampling variability of an
effect-size estimate is influenced by the underlying
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sample size, in much the same way that p-values
are affected by the number of cases utilized in the
study. When the sample size is small, the
discrepancy between the sample effect size and
population effect size is larger (i.e., large bias)
than when the sample size is large. Also, effect
sizes are affected by nonrandom sampling, a
condition that applies to the vast majority of
empirical studies in education and psychology.
Thus, solutions to compensate for the problems
stemming from the role of sample size in statistical
hypothesis testing (e.g., use of confidence
intervals) should also apply to effect sizes.
A valid criticism of hypothesis testing that
is supported by data pertains to the low statistical
power that prevails in many studies. Indeed, the
average power of null hypothesis significance tests
typically ranges from .40 to .60 in empirical
studies (Cohen, 1962, 1965, 1988, 1994; Schmidt,
1996; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989). With an
estimated mean across-study power of .50 (Cohen,
1962, 1997), Schmidt and Hunter (1997) decry
that “[t]his level of accuracy is so low that it could
be achieved just by flipping a (unbiased) coin!” (p.
40). Yet, the finding that power is unacceptably
low in most studies indicates to us that
researchers’ application of statistical hypothesis
testing, rather than its logic, is to blame. Indeed, it
can be argued that low statistical power represents
more of a research design issue than a statistical
issue, since acceptable power can be rectified by
incorporating a larger sample.
Unfortunately, as was discussed earlier,
effect sizes also can fall victim to poor research
designs, in general, and to small sample sizes, in
particular. In fact, an obsession with effect sizes
without considering the associated sample sizes
can have the effect of promoting weak research
designs. As such, in making decisions about which
articles should be published, journal editors should
focus less on p-values and effect sizes and more
on the quality of the underlying research design
(for related discussion and references, see Levin,
1998b, p. 45).
6. Distribution nonnormality. Although
this may surprise or disturb some readers, many of
the commonly used effect-size measures rely
heavily on the parametric hypothesis-testing
assumptions of normality and homogeneity of
variance (see, for example, Fan, 2001, Barnette &
McLean, 1999, and Hogarty & Kromrey, 2001).
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The numerator of common effect-size measures
involves means and mean differences, which are
sensitive to extreme observations, especially when
sample sizes are small (Huck, 2000). In the smallsample case, an extreme observation in one of the
conditions (e.g., the experimental group) can
seriously distort the true mean difference, thereby
unduly inf luencing the effect-size estimate. Just as
outlying observations affect the t-statistic and
associated p-values (statistical significance), in the
independent-samples test of means they also
influence the effect size (practical significance).
For this reason, nonparametric effect-size
measures have been developed and considered.
Applyng Monte Carlo methods, Hogarty
and Kromrey (2001) demonstrated that the most
frequently used effect-size estimates (e.g., Cohen’s
d and Hedges & Olkin’s g) are sensitive to
departures from normality and variance
homogeneity (discussed next). Even trimmed
effect-size measures (Hedges & Olkin, 1985;
Yuen, 1974) exhibit bias when sample sizes are
small, as do several nonparametric effect-size
indices, including Y1 (Kraemer & Andrews, 1982)
and the Common Language (CL) effect-size
statistic (McGraw & Wong, 1992).
7. Score variability (both between and
within samples). Other characteristics of the
sample also affect interpretation of effect sizes. In
particular, the more heterogeneous the sample is
with respect to the variable of interest, the greater
the effect size typically tends to be. This is the
case for both explanatory and predictive studies
(O’Grady, 1982). Moreover, homogeneous
samples, which more often arise from convenience
sampling, can result in range restriction and,
subsequently, attenuate effect sizes (Pedhazur &
Schmelkin,
1991).
Recognition
of
this
complicating situation can be seen in a recent
critique of a report challenging the effectiveness of
teacher education programs by Darling-Hammond
and Youngs (2002):
The effect size also depends on
other context factors, such as the
range of variability in the measure
used, which can change in
different locations and time
periods. For example, in some
eras and in some locations
virtually all teachers held content

degrees or were fully certified, so
these variables do not strongly
predict variations in outcomes.
When much more variability is
present, these variables are
strongly predictive of outcomes.
Thus, several studies have found
strong measured influences of
certification status on student
achievement in states like
California and Texas during the
1990s when there were wide
differences in teachers’
qualifications. (p. 15)
It is also possible for variance heterogeneity to
reduce the effect size. This can be the case when
the sample is too diverse and the heterogeneity
increases error variance, thereby attenuating the
effect size (Lesser, 1959).
Regardless of whether the effect size is
increased or decreased by heterogeneous samples,
interpreting effect sizes that arise from samples
with different degrees of heterogeneity is
inadvisable. In particular, researchers should
exercise caution in comparing effect sizes across
convenience samples. In fact, Daniel and
Onwuegbuzie (2000) refer to sampling bias error
that results in inconsistency of results across
studies as a Type IX error. According to these
authors, this type of error relates to “disparities in
results generated from numerous convenience
samples across a multiplicity of similar studies”
(p. 23).
Further, because the denominator of
common effect-size measures incorporates the
pooled within-conditions variance, heterogeneity
of variance affects effect-size estimation similarly
to the way that it affects statistical hypothesis
testing (and confidence-interval building - as was
seen in Levin, 1998b, p. 53). Moreover, the
problems caused by departures from normality and
heterogeneity of variance when statistical
significance testing is involved are very much an
issue for effect-size measures associated with
more complex family members of the general
linear model. For example, the standard effect-size
indices (e.g., 02 , ,2 , and T2 ) that are often
calculated for OVA-type analyses (e.g., ANOVA,
ANCOVA, MANOVA) assume equal variances –
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an assumption that is not always met
(Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2003).
However, these weaknesses do not imply
that effect sizes should be banned or replaced by
some other sort of index, echoing what some
researchers (e.g., Carver, 1993) recommend
should be the fate of statistical significance testing.
Indeed, in cases where such violations come to the
fore, nonparametric effect sizes (e.g., Y1 and CL)
may be more appropriate, in much the same way
that nonparametric inferential statistics often are
more
appropriate
when
the
parametric
assumptions are violated. The above limitations
pertaining to effect sizes identified above suggest
that: (a) assumptions underlying the selected
effect-size method should be subjected to the same
stringent scrutiny as are statistical significance
tests; (b) combining statistical significance testing
and effect-size indices, after checking all pertinent
assumptions, provides an additional safety net
from false or misleading conclusions, compared to
using either technique alone; and (c) researchers
should pay much more attention to maximizing the
quality of their research designs (e.g., by selecting
an appropriate or optimal sample size) in order to
minimize threats to the model assumptions that
pertain to both the statistical test and the
accompanying effect-size measure of interest.
8. Reliability of the outcome measure
(measurement error). Reliability is a concept that
receives disproportionately scant attention in the
interpretation
of
an
observed
finding
(Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2000, 2001, 2003, in
press; Onwuegbuzie, Daniel, & Roberts, in press;
Roberts & Onwuegbuzie, 2003; Roberts,
Onwuegbuzie, & Eby, 2001; Onwuegbuzie &
Weems, in press; Weems & Onwuegbuzie, 2001).
Reliability (or more precisely, unreliability) can
adversely affect the internal validity of findings
via “instrumentation” problems (e.g., Campbell &
Stanley, 1963; Onwuegbuzie, 2003), through a
reduction in statistical power. Specifically,
Onwuegbuzie and Daniel (in press) demonstrated
that subgroups with scores that generate markedly
different reliability estimates can seriously reduce
statistical power, even when the full-sample (i.e.,
across-groups) reliability coefficient is adequate.
Importantly, however, low reliability
indices adversely affect not just statistical
hypothesis testing; they also negatively impact
effect-size measures. After all, low reliability
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coefficients stem from scores that do not behave in
a consistent manner (Onwuegbuzie & Daniel,
2000, 2001) and it is these scores that are used to
calculate both inferential test statistics and effectsize measures. Thus, effect-size measures are
subject to the same limitations stemming from
inadequate reliability as are p-values. Indeed,
effect sizes should always be interpreted with
respect to the reliability of the outcome measure,
just as has been recommended for statistical
hypothesis testing.
Specifically, there is an inverse
relationship between the reliability of any of the
variables of interest (whether the independent or
dependent variable) and the corresponding effect
size. In fact, such reliability provides an upper
bound for the effect size (Lord & Novick, 1968;
Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Because a study’s
reliability is a function of the study’s obtained
scores rather than a priori test norms
(Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2000, 2002a, 2002b;
Thompson & Vacha-Haase, 2000; Vacha-Haase,
Kogan, & Thompson, 2000; Wilkinson & Task
Force on Statistical Inference, 1999), effect sizes
should not be compared across studies without
taking into account the individual studies’
outcome-measure reliabilities. For further
discussion of reliability and effect size in both
correlational and experimental study contexts, see
O’Grady (1982, pp. 767-770).
9. Scale of measurement. The type and
range of measure used can affect the size of the
effect. It is not unusual for researchers studying a
phenomenon to use different measures. In
particular, in a study of an affective variable,
whereas one researcher might use a Likert-type
scale, another researcher might employ a rating
scale. Still another researcher might employ a
semantic differential scale or a Thurstone or
Guttman scale. Similarly, in an investigation of a
cognitive outcome, whereas one researcher might
administer a multiple -choice test, another
researcher might administer some other type of
closed-ended
instrument
(e.g.,
true-false,
matching), and still another researcher might
administer an open-ended measure such as an
essay.
Although all of these measures yield
scores that can be analyzed statistically, each type
of scale might not be measuring exactly the same
construct. For instance, multiple -choice and essay
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examinations often target different levels of
learning in Bloom’s taxonomy of cognitive
objectives (Bloom, 1956). As such, the effect size
likely would vary as a function of the type of
measure used. Although this apples-and-oranges
situation is typically offered as the primary
rationale
for
meta-analytic
effect-size
combinations (e.g., Hunt, 1997; Rosenthal &
DiMatteo, 2001), it rarely is recognized as a studycomparison concern.
Even if scales with the same item format
(e.g., a Likert-scale format) are used across
studies, both the number/type of items and the
number/type of response options employed can
affect the size of the effect. With respect to the
former, compared to their counterparts with more
items, scales with a smaller number of items lead
to restriction of range, thereby attenuating effect
sizes. Similarly, the proportion of negatively
worded and positively worded items can influence
the effect size (Onwuegbuzie & Weems, in press;
Weems & Onwuegbuzie, 2001). With regard to
the latter, the number of response options also can
influence the effect size. Specifically, a reduction
in the number of response options attenuates the
range of scores, which, in turn, may reduce the
magnitude of the effect.
Similarly, and as was mentioned earlier, a
restriction in the variability of one or more
variables typically decreases the effect size. This
holds for a study’s independent variables, as well
as its outcome measures. As noted by
Onwuegbuzie and Daniel (2003), lacking the
realization that nearly all parametric analyses
represent the general linear model, many analysts
inappropriately categorize independent variables
in nonexperimental research designs in order to
perform analyses such as analysis of variance.
Disturbingly, findings from such analyses are then
used to make causal inferences, when all that has
occurred is a discarding of relevant variance – see,
for example Cliff (1987); Pedhazur (1982);
Prosser (1990); and Thompson (1986, 1988,
1992a).
Yet, categorizing a continuous variable
has been found repeatedly to reduce the effect
size. For instance, a median split of a continuous
variable can reduce the observed correlation by
20% (Cohen, 1983; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990) –
see also Vargha, Rudas, Delaney, & Maxwell
(1996). If the cutpoint used for splitting the

continuous variable differs from the median, then
the reduction in the relationship between the
variables can be expected to be even larger (Fern
& Monroe, 1996).
Moreover, as the number of categorized
groups decreases, less variance in the dependent
variable is accounted for by the categorical
variable, compared to the continuous variable, and
thus the effect size is attenuated (Peet, 1999). With
regard to type of response options, the use of
midpoint categories (e.g., neutral response
options) has been found to affect both score
reliability and effect size (Weems &
Onwuegbuzie, 2001). Therefore, comparing effect
sizes across studies using different types and
formats of scales is questionable.
In addition, it does not appear to be
obvious to some researchers that effect sizes are a
function of the scale of measurement used.
Evidence of this is provided by McLean et al.
(2000), who demonstrated that “gain” effect sizes
were different for the raw scores, scaled scores,
and Normal Curve Equivalent (NCE) scores for
students in Grades 4, 6, and 8 on a national normreferenced test. Specifically, as McLean et al.
expected, the effect sizes for NCE scores were
lower than those for raw and scaled scores. The
researchers appropriately concluded that when
effect sizes are computed, researchers should take
into account the scale of measurement on which
they are based.
Summary
We have highlighted nine general
concerns about effect-size indices. When
researchers design their studies, they must make
numerous decisions. Each of these decisions can
affect the magnitude of the effect-size estimate.
Unfortunately, the extent to which the effect-size
index is influenced by the decisions is almost
always unknown. This suggests that researchers
are not justified in reflexively applying Cohen’s
(1988) effect-size magnitude and adjectival
guidelines across studies in different domains or
across studies that have different research design
and analytical factors. Even more importantly,
because effect sizes vary as a function of researchrelated factors, effect sizes should be compared
only when all of these factors are comparable.
Assessing the substantive significance of an
observed finding based solely on the effect size

STATISTICAL EVIDENCE AND SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE
may be misleading and no more diagnostic than is
a test of a statistical hypothesis (Fern & Monroe,
1996).
This does not mean that effect sizes are
useless. As noted by Fern and Monroe (1996), if
the goal of the researcher is to determine the size
of an effect given the unique combination of
factors that underlie the data, then a computed
measure of effect size is informative. On the other
hand, effect sizes cannot be used as a meaningful
basis for comparison across studies “unless the
researcher understands what, if any, unique factors
contributed to the effect-size estimate” (Fern &
Monroe, 1996, p. 102). In any case, when
reporting effect sizes, researchers should always
specify as many design, analysis, and
psychometric characteristics as possible to help
subsequent researchers decide the extent to which
they can compare their effect sizes with previous
estimates. In other words, researchers should
contextualize their effect sizes (i.e., they should
interpret their effect sizes within study’s specific
parameters).
Many researchers who criticize statistical
hypothesis testing, in general, and those who
advocate replacing p-values with effect size
measures, in particular, fail to mention any of the
limitations associated with effect-size reporting.
Thus, methodologists who criticize hypothesis
testing without also discussing the limitations of
effect sizes are not providing a balanced analysis
but are focusing on the bad practices that have
traditionally been linked to the former approach.
Unfortunately, the just-mentioned concerns about
effect sizes typically are not mentioned by their
advocates. In discussing the limitations, we argue
that effect sizes are not the hoped-for panacea for
empirical research in the social sciences.
Further, we contend that if only effect
sizes were used to interpret statistical data, socialscience research would not be in any better
position than it would if only statistical hypothesis
testing were used in quantitative studies. In fact, in
an effect-size-only world, we submit that socialscience research would be in a worse position, in
that progress would be retarded (Thompson,
1992b) to an even greater extent than that
imagined by hypothesis-testing critic s, in that
statistically “chance” findings would unjustifiably
be promoted by researchers as “real.” We
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reconsider that unfortunate situation in the
following concluding section.
Toward a Détente
The effect-size flaws that we have
reviewed support the assertion that statistical
hypothesis testing and effect-size reporting should
be used in combination. A logical, internally
consistent, way of combining these two
procedures is through Robinson and Levin’s
(1997) two-step suggestion for analyzing
empirical data – namely, that effect sizes are
reported if and only if the observed finding is
statistically significant.
That is, statistical hypothesis testing
should serve as a gatekeeper, guarding against
spurious effect-size estimation. As noted by
Robinson and Levin (1997), the goal of these two
complementary approaches is to prevent the overinterpretation of seemingly impressive effect sizes
“in the absence of formal assessments of their
likelihood” (p. 23). We therefore recommend that
statistical hypothesis testing and effect-size
estimation be used in tandem to establish a
reported outcome’s believability and magnitude,
respectively. As such, tests of significance serve a
valuable purpose in determining whether effectsize measures should be ignored or reported, a
position endorsed by Fan (2001), Levin (1993),
Robinson and Levin (1997), Knapp and
Sawilowsky (2001), and even – we think – Gliner,
Leech, and Morgan (2002).
Let us take a moment to consider the last
part of the foregoing sentence. We say “even”
because Gliner et al.’s recommendation appeared
in a journal whose editorial policy specifically
calls for effect-size inclusions even in the absence
of statistical confirmation: “Furthermore, authors
are required to report and interpret magnitude-ofeffect measures in conjunction with every p value
that is reported” (Journal of Experimental
Education, 2002, p. 94). We say “we think”
because Gliner et al. are internally inconsistent in
their position about always reporting and
interpreting effect sizes in their position.
For example, they agree with Levin and
Robinson’s (2000) distinction between single study investigations and multiple -study syntheses:
“Our opinion is that effect sizes should accompany
all reported p values for possible future metaanalytic use, but they should not be presented as

145

ONWUEGBUZIE & LEVIN

findings in a single study in the absence of
statistical significance” (Gliner et al., 2000, p. 86).
Yet, in the penultimate sentence of their article
they write: “We also recommend reporting effect
size for nonsignificant outcomes” (p. 91).
Addressing this blanket effect-size reporting
recommendation, one of us has pointed out
previously:
This practice is absurdly
pseudoscientific and opens the
door to encouraging researchers to
make something of an outcome
that may be nothing more than a
“fluke,” a chance occurrence.
Without an operationally
replicable screening device such
as statistical hypothesis testing,
there is no way of separating the
wheat (statistically “real”
relationships or effects) from the
chaff (statistically “chance” ones),
where “real” and “chance” are
anchored in reference to either
conventional or researcherestablished risks or “confidence
levels.”...In its extreme form,
effect-size-only reporting
degenerates to strong conclusions
about differential treatment
efficacy that are based on
comparing a single score of one
participant in one treatment
condition with that of another
participant in a different
condition. (Levin, 1998b, p. 45)
Moreover, in a recent survey of the editorial board
members of four educational-research journals
(Capraro & Capraro, 2003), the 97 respondents
(estimated from the data provided) greeted the
recommendation that their journals require effectsize reporting with overwhelming indifference: On
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “very strongly
disagree” to “very strongly agree” the mean rating
was 4.26, t(96) = 1.33, p = .19, for testing the
hypothesis that respondents’ mean ratings do not
differ from the scale midpoint of 4. Given the
study’s relatively large sample size, this
nonrejection of the indifference hypothesis should
be taken with more than a grain of salt.

One additional internal-inconsistency
irony – or at least an example of journal nonpolicing – is worth mentioning. In an article
published by one of the present authors (Hwang &
Levin, 2002) in the same issue of the Journal of
Experimental Education that proclaims the above
effect-size policy, effect sizes were not reported
for every p-value included; nor were they reported
for statistically nonsignificant outcomes. Yet,
somehow, some way, the article was published
anyway! And this is not an isolated event.
A colleague, Dan Robinson, has
experienced effect-size nonenforcement with two
of his articles that were published in the same
journal (Katayama & Robinson, 2000; Robinson,
Katayama, Dubois, & Devaney, 1998), a journal
that has promoted its effect-size policy since 1997
(D. H. Robinson, personal communication,
January 13, 2003). As with Thompson’s (e.g.,
1996) argument in other contexts, perhaps JEE
should be encouraged to take a closer look at its
own editorial policy, for in that journal effect-size
endorsement clearly does not translate into effectsize enforcement. As an informative aside, the
Journal of Experimental Education is apparently
not alone in its effect-size non-enforcement
practices for D. H. Robinson (personal
communication, January 22, 2003) indicates a
similar phenomenon with another effect-size
mandated journal, Contemporary Educational
Psychology. Out of 11 intervention experiments
that he tallied for that journal in 2001, only two
were accompanied by effect-size estimates.
Even those who contend that effect sizes
should replace statistical significance testing (e.g.,
Carver, 1993; Schmidt, 1996) recommend the use
of confidence intervals alongside effect sizes. A
two-sided confidence interval, characterized by
lower and upper bounds, identifies a probable
range of magnitudes for the effect size (Abelson,
1997). As such, confidence intervals can be used
to estimate the range of the effect’s practical
significance – for related discussion, see
Onwuegbuzie (2001) and Thompson (2002).
Moreover, insofar as confidence intervals
include all the information provided by statistical
hypothesis tests, and more (Cohen, 1994; Levin,
1998b; Serlin, 1993), constructing them allows
researchers to conduct the corresponding
hypothesis tests, if desired (Krantz, 1999). In that
sense, then, the provision of an inferential
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confidence interval (instead of a hypothesis test)
has logical appeal because that approach kills two
birds (statistical and practical significance) with
one stone. So as not to confuse the issue, it should
be made clear that the kind of confidence-interval
approach we are endorsing is the single -interval
procedure based on a pre-experimentally
established Type I error probability, which is
inferentially equivalent to applying a NeymanPearson statistical test of hypothesis. This
approach is fundamentally and logically different
from that espoused by certain hypothesis-testing
critics,
which
would
have
researchers
simultaneously provide multiple confidence
intervals (for either raw or standardized effects)
based on different confidence levels, such as 99%,
95%, 90%, 80%, etc. – see, for example, Schmidt
& Hunter (1997) and Thompson (2002).
Alternatively, hypothesis testing per se
can be substantially improved (strengthened) by
applying it in forms that are more intelligent than
the one that is currently practiced. Such more
intelligent forms call for researchers to
formulate/test more theoretically driven and
precise hypotheses, to determine (through power
calculations) optimal sample sizes to test those
hypotheses, and to incorporate equivalence-testing
procedures (e.g., Seaman & Serlin, 1998) for
better establishing the truth of the null hypothesis
(see, for example, Levin, 1998a, pp. 329-330).
At the same time, we contend that
hypothesis tests, confidence intervals, and effect
sizes do not go far enough in the way of
maximizing a domain’s knowledge base. This can
be accomplished only through independent
replications of results (i.e., two or more
independent studies yielding similar findings that
produce statistically and substantively compatible
outcomes). We believe that “a replication is worth
a thousandth p value” (Levin, 1995), as well as its
being worth more than a large effect size based on
a single study. In contrast to Carver (1978),
however, we do not believe that “replicated results
should automatically make statistical significance
unnecessary” (p. 393). Such independent
replicatio ns not only will make “invaluable
contributions to the cumulative knowledge in a
given domain” (Robinson & Levin, 1997, p. 25)
but will also help empirical researchers achieve a
common goal.
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Conclusion
As was noted by Onwuegbuzie (2003), a primary
objective of empirical research – especially
research designed to posit causal relationships – is
to collect and analyze data that help a researcher
make inferences from the sample(s) to the
underlying population, leading to meaningful
conclusions in which as many rival explanations
as possible are eliminated. This is the goal that
drives both statistical hypothesis testing and
effect-size reporting. The extant literature has
documented the limitations of hypothesis testing,
whereas in this paper we have illustrated that
effect-size interpretation is not without its flaws.
No single index by itself is the magic bullet for
analyzing and interpreting data. Rather, using both
methods in combination, or combining confidence
intervals and effect sizes, helps to rule out more
rival threats to statistical-conclusion validity
(Cook & Campbell, 1979; Shadish, Cook &
Campbell, 2002) than would occur if either
method were used alone to interpret observed
findings. At the same time, however, to minimize
both statistical-conclusion validity and external
validity threats there is no substitute for
independent replications.
References
Abelson, R. P. (1997). A retrospective on
the significance test ban of 1999 (If there were no
significance tests, they would be invented). In L.L.
Harlow, S.A. Mulaik, & J.H. Steiger (Eds.), What
if there were no significance tests? Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum, p. 117-141.
American Psychological Association.
(2001). Publication manual of the American
Psychological Association (5th ed.). Washington,
DC: Author.
Anderson, D. R., Burnham, K. P., &
Thompson, W. L. (2000). Null hypothesis testing:
Problems, prevalence, and an alternative. Journal
of Wildlife Management, 64, 912-923.
Bakan, D. (1966). The test of significance
in psychological research. Psychological Bulletin,
66, 423-437.

147

ONWUEGBUZIE & LEVIN

Barnette, J. J., & McLean, J. E. (1999,
November). Empirically based criteria for
determining meaningful effect size. Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Mid-South
Educational Research Association, Point Clear,
AL.
Berkson, J. (1938). Some difficulties of
interpretation encountered in the application of the
chi-square test. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 33, 526-536.
Berkson, J. (1942). Tests of significance
considered as evidence. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 37, 325-335.
Bloom, B. S. (Ed.). (1956). Taxonomy of
educational objectives: The classification of
educational goals, Handbook I: Cognitive domain .
New York: Longman, Green.
Boring, E. G. (1919). Mathematical vs.
scientific importance. Psychological Bulletin, 16,
335-338.
Cahan S. (2000). Statistical significance is
not a “Kosher Certificate” for observed effects: A
critical analysis of the two-step approach to the
evaluation of empirical results. Educational
Researcher, 29(1), 31-34.
Calder, B. J., Phillips, L. W., & Tybout,
A. M. (1981). Designing research for application.
Journal of Consumer Research, 8, 197-207.
Campbell, D. T., & Stanley, J. C. (1963).
Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for
research. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Capraro, R. M., & Capraro, M. M. (April,
2003). Exploring the APA fifth edition Publication
Manual’s impact on the preferences of journal
editorial board members. Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Educational
Research Association, Chicago.
Carver, R. P. (1978). The case against
statistical
significance
testing.
Harvard
Educational Review, 48, 378-399.
Carver, R. P. (1993). The case against
statistical significance testing, revisited. Journal of
Experimental Education, 61, 287-292.
Cliff, N. (1987). Analyzing multivariate
data . San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Cohen, J. (1962). The statistical power of
abnormal-social psychological research: A review.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 65, 145-153.

Cohen, J. (1965). Some statistical issues in
psychological research. In B.B. Wolman (Ed.),
Handbook of clinical psychology. NY: McGrawHill, p. 95-121.
Cohen, J. (1983). The cost of
dichotomization.
Applied
Psychological
Measurement, 7, 249-253.
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power
analysis for the behavioral sciences. New York:
John Wiley.
Cohen, J. (1994). The earth is round (p <
.05). American Psychologist, 49, 997-1003.
Cohen, J. (1997). The earth is round (p <
.05). In L.L. Harlow, S.A. Mulaik, & J.H. Steiger
(Eds.), What if there were no significance tests?
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, p. 117-141.
Cook, T. D & Campbell, D. T. (1979).
Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis
issues for field settings. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
Daniel, L. G., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J.
(2000, November). Toward an extended typology
of research errors. Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Mid-South Educational Research
Association, Bowling Green, KY.
Darling-Hammond, L., & Youngs, P.
(2002). Defining “highly qualified teachers”: What
does “scientifically-based research” actually tell
us? Educational Researcher, 31(9), 13-25.
Falk, R., & Greenbaum, C. W. (1995).
Significance tests die hard: The amazing
persistence of a probabilistic misconception.
Theory & Psychology, 5, 75-98.
Fan, X. (2001). Statistical significance and
effect size in education research: Two sides of a
coin. Journal of Educational Research, 94, 275282.
Fern, E. F., & Monroe, K. B. (1996).
Effect-size estimates: Issues and problems in
interpretation. Journal of Consumer Research, 23,
89-105.
Fisher, R. A. (1925/1941). Statistical
methods for research workers (84th ed.)
Edinburgh, Scotland: Oliver & Boyd. (Original
work published in 1925).
Frick, R. W. (1995). Using statistics:
Prescription versus practice. Unpublished
manuscript, Department of Psychology, State
University of New York at Stony Brook.

STATISTICAL EVIDENCE AND SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE
Gliner, J. A., Leech, N. L., & Morgan, G.
A. (2002). Problems with null hypothesis
significance testing (NHST): What do the
textbooks say? Journal of Experimental
Education, 71, 83-92.
Guttman, L. B. (1985). The illogic of
statistical inference for cumulative science.
Applied Stochastic Models and Data Analysis, 1,
3-10.
Harlow, L. L., Mulaik, S. A., & Steiger, J.
H. (1997, Eds.). What if there were no significance
tests? Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hedges, L. V., & Olkin, I. (1985).
Statistical methods for meta -analysis. Orlando,
FL: Academic Press.
Hogarty, K. Y., & Kromrey, J. D. (2001,
April). We’ve been reporting some effect sizes:
Can you guess what they mean? Paper presented at
the annual meeting of the American Educational
Research Association, Seattle, WA.
Huck, S. W. (2000). Reading statistics and
research (3rd ed.). New York: Addison Wesley
Longman.
Hunt, M. (1997). How science takes sto ck:
The story of meta-analysis. New York: Russell
Sage.
Hunter, J. E., & Schmidt, F. L. (1990).
Methods of meta -analysis: Correcting error and
bias in research findings. Newbury Park, CA:
Sage.
Hwang, Y., & Levin, J. R. (2002).
Examination
of
middle -school
students’
independent use of a complex mnemonic system.
Journal of Experimental Education, 71, 25-38.
Keppel, G. (1991). Design and analysis: A
researcher’s handbook. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Katayama, A. D., & Robinson, D. H.
(2000). Getting students “partially” involved in
note-taking using graphic organizers. Journal of
Experimental Education, 68, 119-133.
Kerlinger, F. N. (1973). Foundations of
behavioral research. New York: Holt, Rinehart, &
Winston.
Kirk, R. E. (1995). Experimental design:
Procedures for the behavioral sciences (3rd ed.).
Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Kirk, R. E. (1996). Practical significance.
A concept whose time as come. Education and
Psychological Measurement, 56, 746-759.

148

Knapp, T. R., & Sawilowsky, S. S. (2001).
Constructive criticisms of methodological and
editorial practices. Journal of Experimental
Education, 70, 65-79.
Kraemer, H. C., & Andrews, G. A. (1982).
A nonparametric technique for meta analysis
effect size calculation. Psychological Bulletin , 91,
404-412.
Krantz, D. H. (1999). The null hypothesis
testing controversy in psychology. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 94, 1372-1381.
Lesser, G. S. (1959). Population
difference in construct validity. Journal of
Consulting Psychology, 23, 60-65.
Levin, J. R. (1967). Misinterpreting the
significance of “explained variation.” American
Psychologist, 22, 675-676.
Levin, J. R. (1993). Statistical significance
testing from three perspectives. Journal of
Experimental Education, 61, 378-382.
Levin, J. R. (1995, April). The
consultant’s manual of researchers’ common statillogical disorders. Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Educational Research
Association, San Francisco, CA.
Levin, J. R. (1998a). To test or not to test
H0 ? Educational and Psychological Measurement,
58, 313-333.
Levin, J. R. (1998b). What if there were
no more bickering about statistical significance
tests? Research in the Schools, 5, 43-53.
Levin, J. R., & Robinson, D. H. (1999).
Further reflections on hypothesis testing and
editorial policy for primary research journals.
Educational Psychological Review, 11, 143-155.
Levin, J. R., & Robinson, D. H. (2000).
Statistical
hypothesis
testing,
effect-size
estimation, and the conclusion coherence of
primary research studies. Educational Researcher,
29(1), 34-36.
Loftus, G. R. (1996). Psychology will be a
much better science when we change the way we
analyze data. Current Directions in Psychology, 5,
161-171.
Lord, F. M., & Novick, M. R. (1968).
Statistical theories of mental test scores. Reading,
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
Maxwell, S. E., & Delaney, H. D. (1990).
Designing experiments and analyzing data: A
model comparison perspective. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.

149

ONWUEGBUZIE & LEVIN

McGraw, K. O., & Wong, S. P. (1992). A
common
language
effect
size
statistic.
Psychological Bulletin , 111, 361-365.
McLean, J. E. (1995). Improving
education through action research: A guide for
administrators and teachers. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Corwin Press.
McLean, J. E., O’Neal, M. R., & Barnette ,
J. J. (November, 2000). Are all effect sizes created
equal? Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the Mid-South Educational Research Association,
Bowling Green, KY.
Meehl, P. E. (1967). Theory testing in
psychology and physics: A methodological
paradox. Philosophy of Science, 34, 103-115.
Meehl, P. E. (1978). Theoretical risks and
tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the
slow progress of soft psychology. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 806-834.
Neyman, J., & Pearson, E. S. (1928). On
the use and interpretation of certain test criteria for
purposes of statistical inference. Biometrika, 29A,
Part I: 175-240; part II 263-294.
Nix, T. W., & Barnette, J. J. (1998). The
data analysis dilemma: Ban or abandon. A review
of null hypothesis significance testing. Research in
the schools, 5, 3-14.
Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1994).
Psychometric theory (3rd ed.). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
O’Grady, K. E. (1982). Measures of
explained variance: Cautions and limitations.
Psychological Bulletin , 92, 766-777.
Olejnik, S., & Algina, J. (2000). Measures
of effects size for comparative studies:
Applications, interpretations, and limitations.
Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25, 241286.
Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2001). Towards a
framework for comprehensive reporting of
empirical findings: The role of statistical
significance, theoretical significance, practical
significance,
and
clinical
significance.
Unpublished manuscript, Howard University,
Washington, DC.
Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2003). Expanding the
framework of internal and external validity in
quantitative research. Research in the Schools, 10,
71-90.

Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Daniel, L. G.
(2000, November). Reliability generalization: The
importance of considering sample specificity,
confidence intervals, and subgroup differences.
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MidSouth Educational Research Association, Bowling
Green, KY.
Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Daniel, L. G.
(2001, April). Indices of score reliability and their
applications. Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Educational Research
Association, Seattle, WA.
Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Daniel, L. G.
(2002a). A framework for reporting and
interpreting internal consistency reliability
estimates. Measurement and Evaluation in
Counseling and Development, 35, 89-103.
Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Daniel, L. G.
(2002b). Uses and misuses of the correlation
coefficient. Research in the Schools, 9, 73-90.
Onwuegbuzie, A.J., & Daniel, L.G. (2003,
February 12). Typology of analytical and
interpretational errors in quantitative and
qualitative educational research. Current Issues in
Education [On-line], 6(2). Available
at
http://cie.ed.asu.edu/volume6/number2/
Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Daniel, L. G. (in
press). Reliability generalization: The importance
of considering sample specificity, confidence
intervals, and subgroup differences. Research in
the Schools.
Onwuegbuzie, A. J., Daniel, L. G., &
Roberts, J. K. (in press). A proposed new “what
if” reliability analysis for assessing the statistical
significance
of
bivariate
relationships.
Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and
Development
Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Weems, G. H. (in
press). Characteristics of item respondents who
frequently utilize midpoint response categories on
rating scales. Research in the Schools.
Pedhazur, E. J. (1982). Multiple
regression in behavioral research: Explanation
and prediction (2nd ed.). New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston.
Pedhazur, E. J., & Schmelkin, L. P.
(1991). Measurement, design, and analysis: An
integrated approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

STATISTICAL EVIDENCE AND SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE
Peet, M. W. (1999, November). The
importance of variance in statistical analysis:
Don’t throw the baby out of the bathwater. Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Mid-South
Educational Research Association, Point Clear,
Alabama.
Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (1992).
When small effects are impressive. Psychological
Bulletin , 112, 160-164.
Prosser, B. (1990, January). Beware the
dangers of discarding variance. Paper presented at
the annual meeting of the Southwest Educational
Research Association, Austin, TX. (ERIC
Reproduction Service No. ED 314 496)
Roberts, J. K., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J.
(2003). Alternative approaches for interpreting
alpha with homogeneous subsamples. Research in
the School, 10, 63-69.
Roberts, J. K., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., &
Eby, R. (2001, April). Alternative approaches for
interpreting alpha with homogeneous subsamples:
The introduction of a new measure of
homogeneous alpha. Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Educational Research
Association, Seattle, WA.
Robinson, D. H., Katayama, A. D.,
Dubois, N. F., & Devaney, T. (1998). Interactive
effects of graphic organizers and delayed review
on concept acquisition. Journal of Experimental
Education, 67, 17-31.
Robinson, D. H., & Levin, J. R. (1997).
Reflections on statistical and substantive
significance, with a slice of replication.
Educational Researcher, 26(5), 21-26.
Rosenthal, R., & DiMatteo, M. R. (2001).
Meta-analysis:
Recent
developments
in
quantitative methods for literature reviews. Annual
Review of Psychology, 52, 59-82.
Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. (1982). A
simple, general purpose display of magnitude of
experimental effect. Journal of Educational
Psychology, 74, 166-169.
Rozeboom, W. W. (1960). The fallacy of
the null hypothesis significance test. Psychological
Bulletin , 57, 416-428.
Rozeboom, W. W. (1997). Good science
is abductive, not hypothetic -deductive. In L.L.
Harlow, S.A. Mulaik, & J.H. Steiger (Eds.), What
if there were no significance tests? Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum, p. 335-392.

150

Sawilowsky, S. S., & Yoon, J. (2002). The
trouble with trivials (p > .05). Journal of Modern
Applied Statistical Methods, 1, 143-144.
Schmidt, F. L. (1992). What do data really
mean? American Psychologist, 47, 1173-1181.
Schmidt, F. L. (1996). Statistical
significance testing and cumulative knowledge in
psychology: Implications for the training of
researchers. Psychological Methods, 1, 115-129.
Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1997).
Eight common but false objections to the
discontinuation of significance testing in the
analysis of research data. In L.L. Harlow, S.A.
Mulaik, & J.H. Steiger (Eds.), What if there were
no significance tests? Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 3764.
Seaman, M. A., & Serlin, R. C. (1998).
Equivalence confidence intervals for two-group
comparisons of means. Psychological Methods, 3,
403-411.
Sechrest, L., & Yeaton, W. H. (1982).
Magnitudes of experimental effects in social
science research. Evaluation Review, 6, 579-600.
Sedlmeier, P., & Gigerenzer, G. (1989).
Do studies of statistical power have an effect on
the power of studies? Psychological Bulletin , 105,
309-316.
Serlin, R. C. (1993). Confidence intervals
and the scientific method: A case for Holm on the
range. Journal of Experimental Education, 61(4),
350-360.
Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell,
D.T. (2002). Experimental and quasi-experimental
designs for generalized causal inference. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
Shaver, J. P. (1993). What statistical
significance testing is, and what it is not. Journal
of Experimental Education, 61, 293-316.
Steering Committee of the Physicians’
Health Study Research Group (1988). Findings
from the aspirin component of the ongoing
Physicians’ Health Study. New England Journal of
Medicine, 318, 162-264.
Thompson, B. (1986). ANOVA versus
regression analysis of ATI designs: An empirical
investigation. Educational and Psychological
Measurement, 46, 917-928.
Thompson, B. (1988). Discard variance: A
cardinal sin in research. Measurement and
Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 21, 34.

151

ONWUEGBUZIE & LEVIN

Thompson, B. (1992a, April). Interpreting
regression results: Beta weights and structure
coefficients are both important. Paper presented at
the annual meeting of the American Educational
Research Association, San Francisco, CA.
Thompson, B. (1992b). Two and one-half
decades of leadership in measurement and
evaluation. Journal of Counseling and
Development, 70, 434-438.
Thompson, B. (1993). The use of
statistical significance research: Bootstrap and
other alternatives. The Journal of Experimental
Education, 61, 361-377.
Thompson, B. (1996). AERA editorial
policies regarding statistical significance testing:
Three suggested reforms. Educational Researcher,
25(2), 26-30.
Thompson, B. (2001). Significance, effect
sizes, stepwise methods, and other issues: Strong
arguments move the field. Journal of
Experimental Education, 70, 80-93.
Thompson, B. (2002). What future
quantitative social science research could look
like: Confidence intervals for effect sizes.
Educational Researcher, 31(3), 25-32.
Thompson, B., & Vacha -Haase, T. (2000).
Psychometrics is datametrics: The test is not
reliable.
Educational
and
Psychological
Measurement, 60, 174-195.

Tryon, W. W. (1998). The inscrutable null
hypothesis. American Psychologist, 53, 796.
Vacha -Haase, T., Kogan, L. R., &
Thompson, B. (2000). Sample compositions and
variabilities in published studies versus those in
test manuals: Validity of score reliability
inductions. Educational and Psychological
Measurement, 60, 509-522.
Vargha, A., Rudas, T., Delaney, H. D., &
Maxwell, S. E. (1996). Dichotomization, partial
correlation, and conditional independence. Journal
of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 21, 264282.
Weems, G. H., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J.
(2001). The impact of midpoint responses and
reverse coding on survey data. Measurement and
Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 34,
166-176.
Wilkinson, L., & the Task Force on
Statistical Inference. (1999). Statistical methods in
psychology journals: Guidelines and explanations.
American Psychologist, 54, 594-604.
Yuen, K. K. (1974). The two-sample
trimmed t for unequal population variances.
Biometrik a, 61, 165-170.

